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Professor Teixeira Ribeiro is mostly known for his work on public 
finance, in particular his celebrated mimeographed Notes that have educated 
generations of economics and law students in Coimbra and Lisbon. It is, 
however, his contribution to the knowledge of international monetary economics, 
rate policy in Portugaland specifically, his analysis of monetary and exchange 
_,
in Introdu~ao ao Estudo da Maeda, over thirty years ago, that is emphasized 
in the present essay. 
A new phase of the Portuguese currency experience was about to begin 
and Ribeiro was already aware of it. As he points out, the predominance 
of the escudo-sterling rate in exchange rate policy had been gradually 
decreas~ng since the fatal 21st. of September 1931. Indeed, a few months 
after the book was published, in September 1949, the escudo remained 
closer to the U.S. dollar and did not follow the pound. 
For over five years now, the predominance of the U.S. dollar has 
itself been eroded and the primary concern of exchange rate policy has 
become the average price of a basket of major currencies, where the D. 
mark and the French franc are as importaat as the former reserve currencies. 
This paper attempts to shed some light on the various exchange rate 
policies followed by the Portuguese monetary authorities since the advent 
of generalized floating in April 1973, by taking an historical perspective 
on the "acceleration hypothesis", according to which appreciation of the real 
exchange rate is associated with a real current account surplus. 
This central proposition of the protfolio approach to exhuge rate 
determination is only tested for the last fifty years, but the analysis 
begins when Portugal adopted the gold standard, one hundred and twenty five 
years ago. 
2 
With such an horizon, the striking feagure of the Portuguese 
currency experience is how resilient the commitment to a fixed nominal price 
of foreign currency has been. Despite vast differences in ideology and com­
petence, it can be said that, in this respect, Salazar in the 1930's and the 
Revolutionary central bankers of 1974-75 are closer to each other than they 
are to contemporary monetary authorities in Mediterranean and Latin American 
countries. 
Indeed, so paradoxical an invariance might well have rooted in the 
days of the Pax Britannica, with the political economy of which we begin. 
3 
I. The Sterling Standard (1854-1949) 
1. In 1854, Portugal adopted the gold standard, rather than the more 
widespread bimetallism, as part of a "regeneration" pro1?ram which emphasized 
free trade and railroads, that is to say the British alliance. The unit of 
account was the real and one pound sterling was worth 4,500 reis. The 
Banco de Portugal, established in 1846 during a financial crisis, issued 
convertible notes in Lisbon, processed the Treasury's cash transactions and 
was a major underwirter of government bonds.
1 
The program of public works and the industrialization drive of the 
50's and 60's were associated with large government and external deficits, 
further enhanced by the increase in the relative price of home goods during 
2
the international deflation of the 70's and 80's. Having survived and 
grown, the Bank of Portugal was granted in 1887 the national monopoly of 
the right to issue bank notes up to three times its gold reserves and 
twice its capital. Government credit, on the other hand, was subject to 
a ceiling of about one sixth of the bank's net worth. In the late 80's, 
however, crop failures increased imports and the spread of the phylloxera 
decreased wine exports, thus increasing the trade deficit. As for public 
finance, Portugal had, after France, the highest debt per capita in Europe, 
the service of which took about half of the govemment budget. 
Against this background, three adverse shocks provoked the traumatic 
crisis of 1891. First, in January 1890, a British ultimatum to withdraw 
from the coveted territories between Angola and Mozambique culminated a 
4 
growing tension between the two unequal allies over colonial policy. Second, 
the customary million pounds in emigrants' remittances from Brazil was reduced 
to a fifth because of the republican revolution there. Third, in November, 
the main underwriter of Portuguese loans, in London, Baring Brothers, found 
itself on the verge of bankruptcy because of overcommitments in Argentina 
and requested a payment of one million pounds on the Portuguese debt. The 
Bank of Portugal was thus forced to use its gold reserves and, despite the 
negotiation in early 1891 of a large loan from the proceeds of the sale of 
the tobacco monopoly to French bankers, Portugal went off the gold standard 
3on July 9. 
With the notes of the Central Bank rendered inconvertible, gold was 
exported and the price of sterling increased by 27 percent. Portugal remained 
a net exporter of bullion until 1908, and experienced deflation during the 
international upswing starting in the mid-90's. However, the immediate 
depreciation of the currency and drastic increases in protection expanded 
domestic manufacturing and exports after the 1892 tariff and agricultural 
output after the 1899 restrictions on imports of wheat. At the turn of 
the century the currency began to appreciate and almost reached par in 
1906. By that time, however,overproduction was besetting the textile and 
wine industries, whilst the more active colonial policy and the foreign 
debt settlement of 1902 caused new strains on the government budget. Poli­
tically the crisis was blamed on the monarchy, which fell almost without 
resistance in October 1910. 
5 
These developments are illustrated in Figure 1, where ten year 
averages of the Portuguese terms of trade index against Britain are plot­
ted, together with an index of the capacity to import (value of exports 
deflated by the price of imports), both based in 1854.
4 The export prooo­
tion from the mid-60s to the mid-80s, the depression of the 80s and the 
recovery of the exports in the 90s are apparent, but the 100st remarkable 
feature is certainly the decline in the terms of trade and the capacity 
to import from 1904 to 1913. 
2. The republican provisional government pledged to balance the 
budget and to restore convertibility. In May 1911 a new unit of account, 
the escudo (= 1000 reis) was created. Having depreciated by 21 percent 
since 191~ sterling was then worth about 5 escudos, so that keeping the 
gold parity of 1854 entailed a 10 percent revaluation of the escudo. The 
return to convertibility did not materialize and the budget was only 
balanced in 1913 and 1914 during the government of Afonso Costa (who held 
the first economics chair at the University of Lisbon). The reluctant 
decision to join the Allies in 1916, in order to protect Portugal's colonial 
interests, entailed a severe drain on government finances: the budget deficit 
and the money supply doubled every two years lllltil 1920. In June, the real 
money supply was still up 29 percent from 1913 and the money supply expressed 
in foreign currency was up 80 percent. The continuing political crisis 
and a substantial increase in capital flight related to the defeat of a 
monarchist uprising led, however, to a brutal fall in the exchange. 
Relative to 1913 values, the figures on the money supply expressed in 
foreign currency were -20 percent at year end and -44 percent in June 1924. 
6 
FIGURE 1 
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7 
The enormous increase in note circulation (650 percent from 1918 to 
1924) was made possible by an amendment introduced in 1918 to the Charter 
of the Bank of Portugal whereby the rule of the third would only apply to 
the "bank component" of circulation, leaving the "debt component" with no 
backing. Indeed the government debt to the central bank increased by 
735 percent during the period. 
At the end of 1923, with sterling at 128 escudos, the newly elected 
government of Alvaro de Castro (an army major with financial expertise) 
created, through sales of gold and silver balances of the government abroad, 
an Exchange Stabilization Fund to intervene in the foreign exchanges. In 
December 1924, when the money supply expressed in foreign currency reached 
the 1913 level, two other governments had already been appointed after 
Castro's fall in July. Sterling reached a peak of 157, then started to 
decline and was finally stabilized until June 1927 at about 95. 
An illustration emphasizing purchasing powers rather than traded 
goods prices is provided in Figure 2, where the average annual real escudo-
sterling exchange rate 
s 
is plotted with base 1914 = 100. Until 1917 the 
rate depreciated owing primarily to British wartime inflation. In 1918 
and 1919, the Portuguese hyperinflation brought the rate of about its base 
value. But the increase of 500 percent in the nominal rate between 1920 and 
1923 left a real depreciation of ten times less, with the index at about 54. 
The effect of the 1924 stabilization measures, and the offset of the pound 
revaluation of 1925 by domestic inflation are also apparent in the Figure. 
8 
FIGURE 2 
REAL STERLING-ESCUDO EXCHANGE RATE 
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9 
Meanwhile, domestic political and s~cial instability continued to 
take toll. In the five years before May 1926 there were ten attempted coups 
which reached the streets and 15 governments (in 1925 alone in the figures 
are 3 and 4 respectively. 6 The last of these coups,on May 28, bloodlessly 
replaced parliamentary institutions with a military dictatorship. Soon 
conservative Gen. Carmona beaame President and appointed as Minister of 
Finance conservative Gen. Sinel de Cordes. 
In December 1927 the government decided to appeal to the League of 
Nations in order to secure a foreign loan.. The condition that a representa­
tive of the League in Nations supervised its use and repayment was, however, 
7 
refused and instead in April 1928 Carmona yielded to the conditions set by 
a prestigious economics professor from Coimbra, Oliveira Salazar, to become 
Minister of Finance. 
.. 
3. The refusal of the League of Nations loan shot up the price of 
sterling in London to 114, from 105 in March, but in one year, Salazar suc­
ceeded in bringing the budget into surplus,in lowering the interest rate 
from 11 to 3.75 percent, in paying the external short term debt, and in 
stabilizing the pound at around 108. 
The return to convertibility was the next step. Based on the obser­
vation that both market prices and the money stock were twenty times higher 
than in 1914, and the escudo was worth 5 percent of the gold parity estab­
lished in 1911, Salazar argued for a definition of the new escudo at about 
that value,-or 110 to the pound. The departure from purchasing power parity 
was explicitly stated: "it is convenient that the currency should have a 
higher purchasing power at home than abroad" and promoting the industrializa­
tion of the country, spreading the utilization of credit instruments and 
inducing a decline in hoarding were identified as reasons for seeking a 
10 
lower real exchange rate. The convertibility of the new escudo into gold 
was to be effective July 1st, 1931, fourty years after. 
However, on September 21, Britain abandoned the gold standard and 
the pound depreciated about 30 percent against the dollar. That very day, 
the decision was taken to follow suit, as long as the depreciation of sterl-
ing would be less than 32 percent. 8 Thus the escudo appreciated relative to 
the dollar in 1933-34 and remained in the sterling bloc throughout the 
depression. 
4. In September 1939, the war-induced depreciation of sterling 
in New York led to greater conc~rn for the stability of the escudo-dollar 
rate. After an initial devaluatiol'I •f about 3 .3 percent, the rate for bilateral 
payments with the sterling area fixed in July 1940 kept the price of the 
dollar at the 1939 level, so that the escudo appreciated 9.1 percent relative 
to sterling. During the war, the balance of payments, and in 1941-43 the 
trade balance as well, was in surplus. These surpluses were entirely monetized 
by the central bank, which kept domes~ic credit at a low level, and despite 
increases in taxation and public borrowing, were transmited iuto wholesale 
prices at the average annual rate of 15 percent. The cost of living increased 
at a lower rate, so that the relative price of non traded goods must have 
declined by about 4 percent p.a. during the war,whilst real GDP only grew 
about .4 percent p.a. between 1938 and 1947. 9 
The revaluation of gold reserves in 1940, the balance of payments 
s_urpluses and the accumulation of wartime credits on the Bank of England 
increased the stock of foreign assets of the Bank of Portugal substantially. 
11 
Thus, in 1946, the Bank's Charter was amended to increase the backing of domestic 
currency from one third to one half, of which only one half in gold. That 
same year, however, the surplus dropped by 73 percent and in 1947 the trade 
deficit more than doubled, with the overall deficit reaching 9 percent of 
GDP. 10 · The real price of sterling was then at 116, its highest level since 
1914. 
Protectionist measures, in particular import licensing, were imposed 
in October 1947 and February 1948 and the loss of reserves were not steriliz­
ed so that the money supply declined significantly in the Fall of 1947 and 
1948, together with prices. The deficit remained, however, and after de­
preciatini in 1948, the real rate appreciated again in 1949 with the 30 
percent devaluation of sterling, to reach 124. 
A new parity which entailed a 13 percent devaluation was then estab­
lished with respect to the dollar. It was to be accepted by the International 
Monetary Fund when Portugal joined twelve years later and, despite the 
sterling devaluation of 1967, remained in force until the Smithsonian realign­
ment of December 1971. 
II. The Dollar Standard (1950-1973) 
1. In 1950, after almost twenty years of cautious pegging to 
sterling, the escudo became effectively pegged to the U.S. dollar. American 
postwar foreign policy, however, was initially viewed with some suspicion. 
Even though Portugal patticipated in the Marshall Plan Conference of 1947, 
and was a founder member of OECE, Marshall aid was only accepted in 1950, 
after NATO had been established, and the postwar deficits were making the 
offer difficult to refuse. 
12 
The impact of the European Cooperation Administration and the European 
Payments Union on the technical staff of the Central Bank and of the newly 
established National Development Fund was significant. The pattern of 
Portuguese economic development in the quarter century of prosperity after 
World War II was, at least in part, the result of the tension between the 
emphasis on internal stability of the financial reform and industrial 
regulation of the thirties and the emphasis on international cooperation 
11of the postwar growthmanship. 
In the fifties the Portuguese growth record was inferior to the 
Southern European average and about the same as the European OECD area 
(4.5 percent p.a. in Portugal from 1950 to 1960, versus 6.7 percent and 
4.6 percent respectively). Even though industrial production increased 
90 percent during the decade, employment in industry increased by 17 percent 
only and in agriculture, output stagnated and employment declined. Capital 
intensive manufacturing investment was emphasized in the First Development 
Plan (1953-58), causing the output of capital goods industries to increase 
at a rate of 22 percent p.a. from 1953 to 1950 versus 4.9% for consumer non­
durables. Despite the high import content of investment and the current 
account deficit of Portugal, the trade surplus of the African territories 
led to an increase inforeign exchange reserves of the Escudo Area and the 
capacity to import throughout the decade. 
In the late fifties, the effort at import substitution was shifted 
to an export promotion strategy, largely as a result of the incentives 
offered by the participation in the European Free Trade Agreement. The 
treaty of Stockholm (1959) allowed Portugal an infant-industry type of 
13 
protection whilst giving Portuguese exports the benefits of the elimination 
of tariffs. In fact the growth of exports to EFTA, and in particular to the 
U.K. and Sweden, exceeded the 15 percent p.a. growth of dollar exports 
12
between 1951 and 1973. 
2. The balance of payments was, nevertheless a source of concern 
in the early 60's, largely because of the impact of the events in the 
Portuguese possessions in India and Africa. As precautionary loans were 
13being arranged in New York and London, however, the labour pull in the 
booming EEC was attracting m::,re and more Portuguese workers. From an 
average of .2 million p.a. in the SO's and early 60's, emigration jumped 
in 1.965 to .5 million and did not decrease significantly until 1973. 
In 1966 migrants remittances increased by 32 percent and were multiplied 
by four in the six following years. 
Thus, in the early 70's one tenth of the population was working 
abroad and remittances reached one tenth of nominal incom~ in other words. 
14
remittances per emigrant were about the same as income per resident. 
The induced increase in the capital labour ratio may explain the 
other~ise peculiar e~~luticn of the distribution of output oy ~rriviry_ 
From 1963 to 1973 the share of manufacturing in GDP increased from 30 
to 36 percent whereas the combined share of agriculture,_forestry and 
fisheries fell from 22 to 15 percent in the same period. This is a large 
share for industry than a per capita income of $1410 in 1973 would have 
predicted, which would be, for a small country, 17 percent in agriculture 
and 30 percent in manufacturing. Similarly, the share of exports 
of manufactured goods increased from 55 to 62 percent between 1963 and 1973. 
14 
whereas the share of agricultural and processed food fell from 26 to 19 per-
15cent. 
3. Overall, emigration brought growth because of the very low 
labour elasticity of output. In fact, in the period 1969-1973, it ac­
celerated to a remarkable 8.7 percent p.a., higher than Greece (7.8 per­
cent) and Spain (6.9 percent) and much higher than the EEC (4.8 percent).16 
This trend was associated with the more liberal economic policies 
followed by Salazar's successor, Marcello Caetano, who became Prime Minister 
in the fall of 1968. During this period, inflation exceeded the EEC average, 
but real wages increased and stock market prices were soaring. 17 
The 1972 free trade agreement with the EEC brought renewed prospects 
for export led growth. In that year, exports reached 27 percent of real 
GDP, with the EEC share increasing from 44 to 47 percent. 
Via goods and factor markets, therefore, Portugal was then economical­
ly integrated with a growing EuroPe and benefitting from the development 
boom in Angola and Mozambique, on the one hand, and the bold schemes of 
18the "Lusa-Brazilian Cultural Community", on the other. 
On the financial side, persistent current account surpluses after 
1965, some international borrowing by the State and the growth of foreign 
direct investment led to the accumulation of gold and foreign exchange 
reserves by the Central Bank. This, despite exchange controls, turned 
the escudo into a strong currency. Thus, at the time of the Smithsonian 
Agreement of 1971, a central rate of 27.5 escudos per dollar was established 
which entailed a revaluation relative to the earlier dollar parity of 28.75 
escudos. Following the second devaluation of the dollar, the escudo was 
15 
allowed to "float" upward and in July 1973 the dollar was worth only 22.31 
escudos. 
4. Nevertheless, there were disturbing features in the Portuguese 
real growth process. In effect, both the ratio of investment to output 
and the rate of growth of productivity were significantly lower than in 
19
the fast growing southern European countries. Also, the traditional 
uneven development of the coast and the interior was exacerbated. In 1970, 
80 percent of the population, and 90 percent of GDP were concentrated on 
the coast from Minho to Setubal, which accounts for only 37 percent of the 
area. The implication was the continuing stagnation of agriculture, wide 
wage differentials across sectors and regions and a marked industrial con-
centration. 
Finally, a long military service called for by the protracted frontier 
war in the African territories involved a greater cost in terms of wa2es 
foregone, and one that was increasingly difficult to justify in a society 
more exposed to affluence. 
Economy and society were, however, about to be subject to dramatic 
external and internal shocks. 
III. Revolution and the IMF Standard (1974- ) 
In fact, in the fall of 1973 the "oil crisis" had a particularly 
severe impact on Portugal who felt the brunt of the boycott without being 
able to avail itself of the abundant oil in Angola. From a foreign policy 
viewpoint, it implied the loss of the Brazilian discreet support of the 
government's colonial stance and helped create the political 
vacuum which Preceded a bloodleAA tAke over bv the "Armed 
20
Forces Movement" on April 25, 1974. 
16 
In February, consumer prices in Lisbon increased at an annua
l rate of 
32.4 percent from 8.4 percent in January, and remained at 1
6.8 per-
21
cent in March to actually decrease in April. The military
 "junta" 
closed the stock market and encouraged substantial wage incr
eases which 
wiped out profits. The drop in profits was further aggravat
ed by extreme 
union militancy and impossible industrial relations. All th
is led to a 
substantial decline in savings and investment, even before t
he widespread 
takeovers of 1975. 
Thus, between 1973 and 1975 savings declined from 19 percent
 of real 
GDP to 4 percent, and the domestic share of investment exoen
diturP fPll fr,.,.., 7? to 
24 percent. At the same time, worker's compensation relativ
e to Portugal's 
main trading partners increased 23.6 percent andher compet
itive position 
22 During the same period, the oil bill increaseddeclined about 13 percent. 
from less than 7 percent of imports to over 17 percent, the 
terms of trade 
fell by 23 percent and the capacity to import by 35 percent.
 
Yet, the redistribution of income toward consumption and pub
lic in­
vestment led to a dramatic increase in imports, uarticularly
 prior to the 
At the aame time, political uncertainty depressedsurcharge of May 1975. 
remittances and increased capital flight further accelerated
 the loss 
loss of international reserves.
23 
Despite their ideological commitment to active policies, the
 monetary 
authorities of this period found themselves following the ru
les of the game 
At the end of 1975, the exchange rate had depreciated byof the gold standard. 
5 percent relative to the SDR parity of March 1973, and had 
revalued by 
10 percent relative to the currency of what was still the m
ain export market, 
17 
24
the U.K., whereas the decline in the foreign component of the domestic 
monetary 'base, which had been responsible for money creation before the 
revolution, was not matched by an increase in domestic credit until mid 
1975. 25 Whilst real money supply declined, the absence of other financial 
assets and the redistribution of income must have increased real money 
deamnd. The nationalization of the banking system in March 1975, at any 
rate, caused a marked shift away from bank deposits and an increase demand 
26for currency. 
The determination of the military government to establish a command 
economy was rejected in the April 1975 elections and led to a power struggle 
which lasted until the return of the last military contingent from An2ola 
in November. The moderate military won and in alliance with social demo-
cratic parties pledged to restore the original spirit of the revolution, 
namely political democracy and a mixed economic system, compatible with 
integration with the European Cormnunity. Not surprisinglY, what came to 
be called the "anarcho-populist" phase of the revolution had left the 
economy in complete disarray. 
The domestic shockF depressed labor productivity, and led-to a 
sudden increase in population, and the external shocks implied a deteriora­
tion in the terms of trade and a reduction in the demand for exports. The 
macroeconomic dilemma of Portugal' in early 1976 was that restoring external 
balance and some basic market mechanisms seemed to involve either reducing 
27workers compensation, or increasing unem~loyrnent or both. 
18 
At that, time, the newly appointed team at the Bank of Portugal 
decided to implement an active exchange rate policy, thus starting to 
devalue the escudo against a basket of currencies: at 
mid year the rate was 7 percent below its level at the end of 1975. However, 
the appointment of a socialist government in August, following the April 
and June elections for Parliament and the Presidency of the Republic 
respectively, was associated with a return to a passive exchange rate 
policy. In fact, the trade weighted rate appreciated almost 1 percent from 
July to October. By then, the objective of the government was stated to 
be the correction of the external deficit, but by year end there was only 
a 13 percent effective depreciation relative to the 1973 parity, coupled with an 
18 percent appreciation relative to the pound. 
In early 1977, it became knowqthat the current account deficit had 
increa~ed by 50 percent. A~ 18 percent devaluation relative to the dollar 
was thus announced on February 25, together with the intention to peg the 
effective exchange rate then in use. In August another discrete effective 
1 . 
ZR
deva1uat i on o f 4 percent was f o11owedbya crawling peg ~o icy at a rate 
of 1.1 percent per month coupled with forward cover by the Central Bank. At 
year end the dollar was worth 40 escudos, whil~t the current account deficit 
had increased by another 20 percent and reached 9 percent of GDP. 
Since early 1977 Portugal had b~~n attempting to reach an agreement with 
the IMF, so that the "Big Loan" from industrial countries, promised by 
the government, would materialize. It took, however, almost two govern-
ments before the priority of external balance was written into the stand-
19 
by agreement negotiated with the IMF in the Summer of 1978. According 
to the letter of intent, tight ceilings on net foreign liabilities, on 
net domestic credit and government credit by the banking system were to 
be established, interest rates were to be raised substantially and the 
crawling peg was to be maintained. Along with the Fund's aversion to cur­
rent account restrictions and flexible exchange rates, import quotas and 
29
the forward cover were to be discontinued. 
Largely as a result of the austerity program the balance of payments 
improved dramatically in 1978. The current account deficit was halved, 
to 775 million dollars, thanks to a 20 percent increase in dollar exports, a 
4.7 percent increase in dollar imports and a substantial increase in remit­
tances. Indeed, very high interest rates and the spreading of deposits in 
foreign currency for emigrants attracted 1.5 billion dollars in remittances, 
whereas the capital inflow has been estimated at about 1 billion. This 
led to a balance of payments surplus of .157 million dollars in 1978, 
after a deficit of 1,437 in 1977. 
30 
On the other hand, real growth was also halved to 3 percent, un­
employment remains at well over 12 percent, real wages must have fallen 
by about 4 percent and the government borrowing requirements were about 
28 percent above the target of 60 million contos. The current negotiations 
for a new standby agreement with the IMF, which were interrupted when the 
1979 Budget and Plan were defeated in Parliament in March, concentrated 
on meeting the public sector target for 1979 through increased taxation. 
31 
The recent increase in the price of oil has led to a forecast of an oil 
bill of 14-19 percent of imports and it is unlikely that the current 
20 
32 
account deficit will improve in 1979. The rate of crawl is nevertheless 
supposed to decrease from an average of 1.31 percent in January and Februaary 
to about .75 percent per month, in an effort to fight inflation. 
IV. The Exchange Rate and the Balance of Payments in the Long Run 
The interaction of world inflation and the domestic price of foreign 
exchange since the bilateral rate against the U.S. dollar became of greater 
concern can be summarized by an index of the purchasing power of the escudo 
33
for a U.S. investor. Of course, if Portugal fixes the price of the U.S. 
dollar, as she did from 1950 to 1970, U.S. inflation determines the rate of 
decline of the purchasing power of the escudo over U.S. goods and services, 
an average of 2.42 percent p.a. 
From 1929 to 1934, on the other hand, the purchasing power of the 
escudo increased by 33 percent due to both the dollar devaluation and U.S. 
deflation. In the periods 1934-1949 and 1975-78 the decline in the 
purchasing power of the escudo was also due to exchange rate depreciation 
and U.S. inflation. In 1949, thepurchasing power had declined by 60 percent 
relative to 1934 and in 1978 it was 60 percent below the 1973 level and 87 
percent below the 1929 value. Over the fifty year period, therefore the 
purchasing power of the escudo has decreased at a rate of 4.2 percent 
p.a., whereas domestic inflation has proceeded at a rate of 4.9 percent p.a. 
so that the real price of the escudo in terms of dollars had increased 
by about .7 percent p.a. and was in 1978 41 percent above the 1929 value. 
The real escudo price of the dollar at year end is plotted in 
Figure 3 from 1929 to 1978. The choice of the beginning year is rather 
conventional and does not carry the implication that in that year the real 
exchange rate was at its long run equilibrium value. Between the periods 
21 
Figure 3 
The Real Escudo-Dollar Exchange Rate 
(1929-78 base 1936 • 100) 
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1931-34 and 1947-50, when there were sizable changes in the sterling-dollar 
rate, the real price of the dollar exhibits roughly the same behavior as the 
real price of the pound in Figure 2 above. Thus, after a depreciation tmtil 
1940, both rates appreciated during the war years, the dollar slightly more 
than the pound. Then the dollar rate depreciated rapidly until 1951
34 
and 
remained stable for about 15 years. In 1970 it was back to the 1936 level. 
The first half of the 70's witnessed a very severe appreciation: in 1975 
the real escudo-dollar rate was over 55 percent above the 1970 level. The 
last three years brought the real rate roughly to the 1973 level. 
In the last 40 years Portugal went through two similar cases of a 
quick reversal of the real appreciation of the escudo. The first occurred 
in the immediate postwar period and stabilized after the pound devaluation 
35 whereas the second is still in the making.of 1949 
These reversals were associated with balance of payments deficits, 
as shown in Figure 4, where the percentage rate of change of the real 
exchange rate against the dollar is plotted together with the changes in 
the real stock of foreign assets of the Bank of Portugal from 1936 to 
1978. 
That a real appreciation of the currency is associated with a reai 
current account surplus in a stationary economy with inflation is a 
straightforward implication of the main message of the portfolio approach 
to flexible exchange rates and currency convertibility, the "acceleration 
36 
•hypothesis 11 But that the association would remain in an environment of 
exchange controls, predominantly fixed rates and negligible private capital 
account would be startling. Indeed, Table 1 shows that the association 
explains less than 10 percent of the variance in the real exchange rate, 
FIGURE 4 
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TABLE 1 
THE REAL ESCUDO-DOLLAR RATE 
AND THE REAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(annual data 1936-78) 
a b R2 SER D.W. p F 
1. Ordinary Least 
Squares • 943 ,997 .087 6 .869 1,396 3.916 
Standard error 1.048 .504 
Significance 
Level% 15 2.5 5.2 
2. Cochrane-Orcutt 
iterative auto- .837 .874 .053 6.589 2.019 .284 2.282 
correlation 
correction 
standard 1. 39() .578 .021 
error 
Significance 
75 13.SLevel 25 
Notes: a) Regression GREXIE =a+ b RBNMT 
Where GREXIE is the percentage change in the end of year real rate, series (12) 
in the Appendix 
RBNNT is the stock of foreign assets of the central bank in billion of 
constant purchasing power escudos, series, series (13) in the Appendix. 
b) standard errors in parenthesis below coefficients 
c) D.W. upper bound at 5% significance level= 1.45 
25 
The regression implies that on an average a one billion real escudos 
(where real means in units of purchasing power over U.S. goods) surplus 
is associated with a 1 percent increase in domestic inflation or, in the 
periods 1936-49 and 1973-78 a 1 percent appreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate or some combination of the two. Therefore, the association between the 
Portuguese inflation in the late 60's and early 70's and the pegging of the 
nominal rate can be seen as a consequence of the real acceleration hypothesis 
for about 7 percent of the 36 percent increase in the real rate between 1969 
and 1973 (with about 42 percent domestic inflation). 
In 1974, the real rate went up by 19 percent, close to the peak of 
there was a real deficit of 5 billion escudos.20 percent in 1940, whereas 
In 1975, there was a real depreciation of about 5 percent but the real deficit 
was 7 billion esudos and in 1976 the real rate was roughly constant whilst 
the deficit remained at a high 6 billion escudos. In 1977, the real de­
preciation was over 7 percent and the real deficit 2 billion. The perverse 
relationship of 1974 and 1976 went in the opposite direction in 1978 since 
the real depreciationofover 8 percent was associated with a surplus of 1.3 
billion, rather than a deficit of 8 billion predicted by tne regression in 
Table 1. Accordingly, the regression of tne real effective excnange rate of 
the escudo against the real balance on non-monetary transactions from 1973 
to 1978, shown in line 3 of Table 2, is insignificant. 
The changes in the nominal exchange rate, in particular in the 
effective rate, are, however, well explained by the current account, as 
shown in lines 1 and 2 of Table 2. Pl iott ng together changes in the dollar 
rate and the current account--the balance on nonmonetary transactions is 
included for comparison with the eawrlier measures, based on changes in the 
real stock of foreign assets of the central bank--shows quite clearly the 
relevance of the nominal acceleration hypothesis in the recent Portuguese 






The Exchange Rate and the Current Account 
Quarterly data 1973; 2 - 1978; 4 
a b R2 SER DW* F 
Escudo-dollar rate 
Ordinary least squares -1.120 .196 .129 5.00 1.90 3.103 
(1.309) ( .112) 
Significance level % 15 5 8.9 
Effective rate
Ordinary least squares -1.523 .193 .216 3.60 1.64 5. 771 
(.942) (.080) 
2.4Significance level% 8 2 
Real effective rate
Ordinary least squares, -.025 .141 .016 5.28 1. 76 .344 
(1. 348) (. 240) 
5 7.1Significance level% 100 25 
Notes: *D. W. upper bound at 5% significance level is 1. 32la) 1-2: regression e-e_1 100 •a+ bCAB 
[ e ..J. i 
where e is the period average price of foreign currency, 
l"'A'P. i .. rh,:, r11rr12.ni: account balance in hundred million 
dollars at an annual rate from series (39) in Appendix 4. 
3: Regression as in Table 1 
b) Standard errors in parentheses 
FIGURE 5 
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Conclusion 
The foregoing description of exchange rate policies in Portugal shows 
a long term commitment to pegging to a dominant currency, sterling until the 
thirties, the dollar until the early seventies and a kind of world money 
since 1977. Episodes of "flexibility" were associated with the aftermath 
of the 1891 crisis, the hyperinflation of the early 20's and the recent 
macroeconomic difficulties. 
Our analysis suggested that, despite such commitment the real 
exchange rate has moved roughly in line with the prediction of the accelera­
tion hypothesis, and furthermore, that a perverse relationship occurred during 
the current floating rate period, particularly in 1974, 1976 and 1978. The 
greater importance of the capital account, in particular of external opera­
tions of the banking sector, explains the case of the last two years, whilst 
the first is to be attributed to a passive exchange rate policy on the part 
of the central bank. Taking inflation as given, however, the changes in the 
nominal exchange rate have followed closely the current account strictly de­
fined in the last five years. It can be shown that this reaction function 
for the monetary authorities is theoretically acceptable, not only in a 
regime of free float, but also in a regime where private capital account 
transactions are restricted~ and the stock of foreign assets of the private 
38 
sector is therefore valued at a "black market" exchange rate. · 
It is not clear, however, that such was indeed the predominant 
reaction function of the Portuguese monetary authorities during the period. 
As shown elsewhere, the rate of crawl is better explained by the government 
deficit than by the current account deficit, and given that exchange rate 
depreciation determines inflation in the traded goods sector, the relation-
29 
ship between the real exchange rate and the real current account is perverse 
when the government deficit moves differently from the current account, as 
39
occurred in 1975, 1977 and 1978. 
But the details of the current experience are well beyond the scope 
of this paper. Suffice it to restate the paradox that the commitment 
to a fixed exchange rate, or in the limit a fixed rate of change in the 
exchange rate, was taken by monetary authorities with widely different 
ideological values. Given the acceptance of the rules of the game, the 
episodes of external disequilibrium are associated with disequilibria in 
the accounts of the public sector. It is therefore no wonder that the 
analysis of monetary policy in Portugal has owed so much to public finance 
specialists. Professor Teixeira Ribeiro is in good company. 
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FOO'NOTES 
1References about the monetary history of Portugal in this period 
are virtually non-existing. The money textbooks of Ribeiro (1949), Lumbrales 
(1962) and Cunha (1970) are short in history and the historical works of 
Livenoore (1966), Marques (1972) and Wheeler (1978) are short in economics. 
A. Martins (1976) has a curious but thin Marxian-Rostowian interpretation 
of the 1910-33 period. A remarkable interpretation in terms of "informal 
colonialism in Anglo-Portuguese relations", building on the famus free 
trade treaty of Methuen in 1703, is in Sideri (1970). In his discussion 
of "Mercantilism versus free Trade", Sideri subscribes to the Hecksheer 
view of Hume which deemphasizes the relative price effect of the price­
specie-flow mechanism to emphasize the positive effect of an increase in 
money on production (seep. 78-81 and p. 93 note 59), whereas the convention­
al view, expressed by Viner, contends that changes in the terms of trade are 
the main mechanism of adjustment. The perennial controversy about the 
transfer problem is, of course, at the heart of the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments, where the divergence between income and expenditure, 
balance of payments equilibrium. For the doctrinal aspects of the Chicago­
IMF approach see Frenkel (1976a p.41) and Macedo (1978a). Given 
Sideri' s right intuition, his assertion "although the country adopted the 
gold standard in 1854, she ·never obtained monetary autonomy ••• " (p. 150) 
is puzzling. On the 1846 financial crisis, see Subercaseaux (1912, p. 22 
and 387), who draws on o. ~artins (lP.99). 
2The relative magnitudes are crucial to assess whether there was a 
private domestic savings gap. since 
S - I • DEF - CAD 
p p 
where S is private domestic savings
p 
31 
I is private domestic investment 
p 
DEF is the government overall qeficit 
CAD is the current account deficit in domestic currency. 
Roughly if the government deficit is larger than the current account 
deficit, wealth is increasing by more than the addition to the capital stock. 
Of course changes in the valuation of claims to physical capital, of the 
price of government bonds and of the exchange rate blur this simple identity, 
but the following numbers in million pounds show that this was probably the 
case during the 19th century. 
Increase in 
Increase in Pub. Bank Note 
Debt Trade Deficit Circulation 
(1) (2) (3) 
3.2 .1331855-65 21.8 
1865-75 24.9 3.1 .508 
1878-85 36.6 5.1 .512 
1886-1910 23.7 20.8 n.a. 
Source: (1) and (2) Reported in Sideri (1970, p. 176 and 238); (3) European 
Historical Statistics p. 675. 
Even though the absence of figures during the interval 1886-1910 is parti­
cularly troublesome we see that there was no savings gap. Using available 
data from EHS on government tax revenue and expenditure we hav~ denoting 
bank notes by C, in million pounds: 
DEF CAB t;C 
1878-87 23.11 5.7 1.1 
1888-91 -48.44 3.1 6.3 
and we see that there was indeed a savinEf3gap in the wake of the 1891 crisis. 
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3Another difficulty of the period had to do with the "cause celebre" 
of the Dom Miguel loan. Floated in Paris in 1832, during the war that 
his brother Pedro, former emperor of Brazil, was waging to recover the 
throne for his daughter Maria, the bonds wer.e not considered an obligation 
of the Crown, and after Miguel's defeat in 1834 no further payments were 
made. Even though new Portuguese bonds were floated in London, this incident 
undermined the credit worthiness of the State• Thus, in 1837, no more loans 
could be secured, leading the country into successive debt adjustments in 
1840, 1845 and 1852. Only in 1856 -- and not in 1852 as Sideri (1970, p. 
150) would have it -- did the settlement seem satisfactory and new bonds 
were issued. Despite continued protests from holders of defaulted bonds, there 
were numerous Portuguese issues until, in 189~ a French issue failed and 
this was ascribed to the influence of the bond-holders leading to a final 
settlement of the matter in the "tobacco loan" of 1891. See details in 
' 
Wynne (1951 p. 361) and further references in Macedo (1970, p. 181 note 
312). The Baring crisis had a great impact in Argentina as well. See 
Williams (1920, p. 114) and, for a passionate account, Ortega-Duhalde (1968). 
4
These are ratios of unit value indices of British exports to Pl rtugal 
and Portuguese Imports into Britain linked from series based in 1854 and 
1870, computed by Sideri (1970, p. 202). He also links an index from 1913 
to 1938, but after having decreased for 4 decades the coverage of the 
index increases drastically (from 54 percent to 72 percent for exports and 
from 61 percent to 89 percent for imports) (seep. 228) and it was therefore 
left out of the figure. The values are 
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Terms of Trade Capacity to Import 
(Px/ePM) (PXQX/ePM) 
1914-23 43.3 93.7 
1924-33 48.S 94.7 
1934-38 51.0 93.9 
so that it is clear that the decline goes on until 1923 and some improve­
ment occurs in the thirties. 
5rhis index is obtained by dividing the Portuguese cost of living 
index based in 1914 = 100 (which is a simple avera~e of retail prices for 
food and housing supplies in Lisbon and Oporto computed by the Institute 
Nacional de Estatistica and reported in INE, Anuario Estatistico) by the 
product of the index of the average price of sterling in London (from the 
same source) and the British cost of li~ing index, based in 1914 = 100 
(also a simple average computed by the Ministry of Labour and reported in 
the Boa re of Trade, Statistical Abstract of the United Kingdom until 1947}. 
Diaz (1978 ?• 15) and (1979a, p. 6) computes three year averages of the 
inverse of our index using the import exchange rates against the dollar of 
seven major Latin American countries from 1929 to 1960. See footnote 35 below. 
a detailed6 Wheeler (1978), from where these figures are take~ has 
account of the political history of the First Republic. Another reference 
is Marques (1975), who has a chapter on economic conditions. A political­
economic analysis of a 1917 urban revolt motivated by lack of bread (one 
in many) is in Valente (1978), and the curious bank note forgery of 1925 
is the subject of Kisch (1932). In Nurkse et al. (1946), there is a 
brief account of the stabilization measures of 1924, from where the index 
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numbers on the money supply in foreign currency are drawn. They are not 
comparable to the ones underlying Figure 2 because only the dollar rate is 
reported but they eliminate the effect of the changes in the sterling-dollar 
rate between 1913 and 1924 (.9 percent p.a. increase in the dollar price of 
sterling on an average). 
7sinel did not wait for the outcome of his budget (a deficit five 
times higher than the previous year) to attempt to secure a foreign loan. 
He went immediately to Paris and London, where,in December 1926, he arranged 
a settlement of the war debt with Churchill. In January 1°27, as Mr. E. B. 
Baring came to Lisbon to discuss the details of the operation, republican 
exiles in Paris (the "Paris League") made it be known that such a loan was 
unconstitutional and would therefore not be honored if they returned to 
power. Given several attempted coups making their threat credible. Baring 
and associates suggested that the government obtain the approval of the operation 
by the League of Nations (the first such request for an Ally). After the 
request was issued and the League of Nations team (including Loveday and 
Rueff) had come to Lisbon, the Paris League sent another letter of protest, 
signed by Afonso Costa and Alvaro de Castro among others, to Geneva where 
they use as one argument against the loan that Salazar had written an article 
against it (!)--The document is in Marques (1976, p. 94) and the article is 
cited in Nogueira (1977, I, p. 327)--After the team returned to Geneva, a 
Portuguese delegation was sent but the issue of control was not solved and 
the League of Nations requested a postponement. As the Portuguese mission 
refused, the negotiations were closed on March 9 (ibid., p. 231). This 
episode mentioned in Livermore (1966, p. 331), is part of the oral tradition 
about Salazar's arrival to power, strikingly revived in Nogueira (1977) 
and Marques (1976) has a collection of press clips on the topic. Wynne (1951), 
quoted in Dornbusch (1979), gives the story. In footnote 68, p. 384 
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Wynne refers that his source was Tyler (1945), even though he cites the 
publication date as 1944. Furthermore, instead of the "detailed account on 
pp. 117-124" of his quote, there is a single reference on p. 16: "Schemes 
concerning Albania, Portugal and Roumania were also considered, but did not 
mature for reasons illustrating some of the pitfalls that beset the path of 
reconstruction." Probably Wynne had access to a more complete version than 
the one that was published. That this particular episodewouldhave been 
cut is no surprise since, as Wynne starts by saying, "no League report 
on Portugal was ever printed." To my knowledge, the only League source where 
the matter was discussed is Nurkse et al. (1946) where, almost as an Ap­
pendix to Nurkse' s analysis in Part I, there is in the anonymous Part II, 
"Survey of European Currency Stabilizations", a 2 page account of the 
Portuguese experience with a few lines devoted to the League loan: "A 
renewed rise of the import surplus in 1927 increased the strain on the pro­
visional stabilization rate. Negotiations for an international loan under 
League auspices were therefore opened in January 1928, but they proved 
abortive because the Government declined to accept the arrangements f0r 
supervision which were m~de a condition. The weakening of the exchange in 
the early part of 1928 was undoubtedly connected with the negative outcome 
of the loan negotiations. Temporary stabilization credits were, however, 
obtained abroad, while the government wisely set to work the effect the 
necessary reforms without the aid of any long term loans. This action was 
crowned with signal success ••• " (p. 117). We can also gather the signi-
f iance of the episode from a note from the Ministry of Finance dated February 
5, 1936 and written by Salazar in cooperation with Lumbrales, entitled "The 
Budget and Public Accounts in the League of Nations Yearbook", reproduced in 
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Salazar (1945 p. 383 ss). After criticizing the concept of budget deficit accepted 
by the Yearbook, the note concludes by saying that the director of the 
Financial Department (Loveday) had agreed with the Portuguese view and it adds: "It 
turns out that the director of the Financial Department was the secretary 
of the financial committee who came to Portugal in 1927 to study our situation. 
As he has known the past, he admires more than the others the present .•• " 
(p. 394). Incidentally, the substance had to do with the difference between 
current deficit and borrowing requirements. As Ribeiro (1976, p. 60 
footnote 2 in fine)points out, the justification given in Salazar's note 
could not apply to all borrowing by the State but only to borrowing for 
investment. 
8A discussion of the various alternatives as seen by the Central 
Bank is in Emidio da Silva (1937). See also Ribeiro (1949). The return 
to the gold standard was decided in Decree-Law 1986, of 6/9/31. Decrees­
Law 20683 of 12/29/31 and 21900 of 5/2/32 postponed its enforcement 
successively until 4/30/33. By then the hopes of a return to the gold 
standard must have faded and Decree-Law 22496 of 5/4/3 postponed it 
indefinitely. The initial financial package is collected in Salazar (1930). 
A fascinating personal account is Salazar (1937). This book, entitled 
How to Rebuild a State, was published in Prance and was not translated 
into Portuguese until 1977! 
9Ribeiro (1952, p. 240) reports the first estimates of Portuguese 
nominal GNP for 1938 and 47-51. It was deflated by a weighted average of 
the wholesale price index (the share of manufacturing in gnp • .36) and 
the retail price index of the Bank of Portugal, both reported in Wallich 
(1951, p. 53), which were also used to arrive at the estimate of the 
37 
change in the relative price of non traded goods during the war. On the 
position of Portugal in the sterling area and its various accounts see 
Cassels (1951, esp. p. 26, 94, 191) and Tew (1952, p. 118). 
10nata from Ribeiro (1949, p. 88) and (1952, p. 240). See also 
J. Beleza (1950) and Wallich (1951) for detailed accounts of monetary 
policy at the time. 
11As Wa111ch (1951 , p . 29) put s . "the Bank (of Portugal)· it· has 
been a tower of strength, but it has not been a major element of flexibility." 
The political implications of the Atlantic Alliance are exposited in 
Salazar (1949), and the pedagogic effect of the Marshall aid is emphasized 
by A. M. Barbosa (1969). A description of the varius operations can be found 
in Macedo (1970). On the participation of Portugal in the OECE and the EPU 
see Lumbrales (1964) and Xavier (1970). 
12One basic reference for the growth process in the SO's and early 
60's is Pintado (1964). See also Chabrier-Rosenblatt (1966). For trends in 
foreign trade and investment in the early 70's see Macedo (1977, p. 271 ss) 
and for industrial concentration see M. Martins (1973) . 
.., 
~JFor an account of these operations involving (of course) 
Baring Brothers, see Macedo (1970 p. 181ss). 
14 
see estimates and further evidence in Macedo (1972b). In discussing 
the employment problem, Pintado (1964) mentions rural migration to the cities 
but only within the territory. In the analyses of Barbosa (1977a), Mateus 
(1978a) and Beleza (1979) international migration is of course a fundamental 
feature. Barbosa, in particular, integrates labor mobility, growth and the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments in a portfolio model to conclude 
the emigration should have been higher for the rate of return on securities to 
reach the steady-state level (1977a, p. 160). 
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15 see Balassa (1977, p. 226 note 1), who takes as the norm the cross 
section results of Chenery-Syrquin (1975). 
16The figures refer to GDP at 1975 market prices (OECD, National 
Accounts 1952-1977). The average for 16 industrialized countries between 
1949 and 1972 at 1970 U.S. prices was 4.81 percent, from Kouri-Macedo 
(1979, Table I), Portuguese regular national account figures start in 1953. 
The rate of growth from 1953 to 1973 of GDP at 1970 market prices was 5.6 
percent p.a. (IFS, May 1977). 
17 Increasing 31 percent p.a. in the period 1968-1973. Consumer price 
inflation increased about 8.4 percent p.a. and real wages in manufacturing 
about 1 percent p.a. on average. They reached a peak in 1970, however, and 
declined in 1971 and 1972. See Macedo (1979a). 
18For an analysis of the prospects for political integration at the 
time see Macedo (1972a). 
19The investment ratio in the sixties was about 17 percent and in 
the nine of the EEC the average was about 22 percent. Productivity grew 
at about 5.5 percent p.a., versus 4.4 percent in the EEC but 8.3 percent 
in Greece and 6.7 percent in Spain. These numbers, which may not be too 
reliable, are from the European Commission's document on enlargement, 
and are discussed in Macedo (1979a). 
20 on the effect of the oil crisis on the "shadow price" of gas in 
Portugal see Macedo (1973b) and on the question of the Brazilian support 
see Macedo (1978b). 
21This understated inflation, in particular because housing subject 
to rent control is included in the Lisbon CPI used, with a weight of 11.1%. 




See Abel et al. (1977),Kavalsky-Agarwal (1978) and Macedo (1979a) for 
further evidence. 
23 . 
In fact merchandiaeimports reached an all time high in December 1974: 
25.3 billion escudos versus 1973-1975 monthly average of 8. On the terms 
of trade see Banco de Portugal (1977), Table II.8, p. 104and below in the 
text. Remittances, on the other hand fell from 26.8 billion escudos in 1974 
to 21.6 in 1975. Real remittances per emigrant fell even further. Using 
The effective rate then used by the Bank of Portugal (see Appendix 2) 
1970 consumer prices and total emigration since 1960 they were computed at 
in 1973, 19.9 in 1974 and 13.8 in 1975. See Taylor (1977) Table VIII, 
page 14. 
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had depreciated 3.8 percent in December. See 1976 Report, p. 190. This 
implies the same level it had in September, when the direction of the bank 
became "technocratic" again. 
25 see Cardoso-Hill (1977) Figure 1. 
26 see Fry (1978), Table 2, page 264. The ratio of currency to M2 
was 12.7 in the fourth quarter of 1973 and 26.7 and 28.5 in 1975; 3 and 
4 respectively. 
27See Krugman-Macedo (1979) for an analysis along those lines. 
28Advocating the system see Dornbusch-Taylor (1977) and assessing it 
see Dornbusch (1979) and Mateus (1978b) and (1979). 
29The letter of intent is in Economia, May 1978, p. 307-315. 
30On the turnaround of 1978 see Barbosa-Beleza (1979) and Krugman-
?iacedo (197Q). That such quick turnarounds are a mixed blessing is forcefullv 
argued by Diaz (1979b) when reviewing the stabilization experience of Argentina, 





Parliament was dissolved in July, however, and the caretaker 
-
government appointed then has increased the deficit (of the 1979 budget!) 
by about 10 percent. 
32
The oil share was 16 percent in 1977 and 11 percent in 1978. See 
Kavalsky-Agarwal (1978) p. 40. The forecast in early 1979 was a $1 billion 
de:icit (Expresso n° 330 of 4/21/79) which seems unduly pessimistic. 
31This is simply defined as the inverse of the U.S. price level 
denominated in escudos (see Macedo (lQ]gc) for a discussion and examples). 
't1ost annual d.ata in the IFS tapes start in 1Q4R, hut the early issues 
included data from 1Q3F-. With respect to Portugal, however, price data 
started in 1Q30, so that the retail price index referred to earlier (see 
footnote S) was used for the period 1915-38. The consumer price index 
reported in IFS is the Lisbon f"PI hased on a 1Q4~ hudget survey (and in­
cluding rent). The rate used in the IFS Tape is the average market rate, 
which from 104~ to 1°72 is the huying rate in New York, fluctuating within 1 
percent margins relative to the parity of 28.75. Note finally that the 
avera~e es~urlo rlollar rat~ in }Q1~, hefore the Roosevelt devaluationt 
was 11.17 and at the end of the hase year it was ?2.17, only slightly 
below the July 1973 low reported above in the text, and about the same 
as during the period 1928-31, when the escudo was de facto stabilized 
against the pound. 
34With common base 1929 • 100, in 1933 the real price of the dollar 
was at a low 78 and the real price of sterling at 102. In 1946 the figures 
were, respectively, 146 and 152, but after the deflation of 1947 which brings 
the rates to 116 and 134 respectively in 1948, the devaluation of sterling 
shoots its real price to 168 whereas the real price of dollars is less than 
2 percent above the base value. 
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35Except for the wartime appreciation, this pattern contrasts with 
the one observed in major countries in Latin America, where there was a 
real devaluation of 50 percent and over against the dollar in the thirties, 
whereas in Portugal the real price of sterling was basically at its 1929 
level until 1937 and there was an appreciation with respect to the dollar 
in 1933 which remained 5 percent above the 1929 level until the war. 
In the post war a real depreciation against the dollar did occur but unlike Mexico 
Colombia, or Peru it resulted after 1950 from low domestic inflation. 
\ 
In 
so far as the rate was virtually fixed since 1929 the comparison with 
Cuba who pegged to the dollar (Diaz 1978 p. 17) mi?ht be more appropriate. 
Indeed the minister of the U.S. in Portugal Col. Th. Birch had proposed a 
military intervention in 1919, arguing: "In my opinion the Portuguese 
are as capable of self government as the Cubans. If they establish a 
government by legitimate methods and if that government is protected by 
the Allies as the United States protects Cuba ..• " (quoted in Wheeler 1978, 
p. 199). However, Portugal was less open an economy, and did not partake 
as intensely as Cuba did of the benefits and costs of the international 
division of labor. The League of Nation's 1938 International Abstract of 
Economic Statistics 1931-1936 states emphatically. "Few countries can be 
proud to have been affected so little by the 1929 crisis as Portugal" (p. 194). 
360n the acceleration hypothesis see Kouri (1978). An application 
to regimes of currency inconvertibility can be found in Macedo (1979c). 
37, For a discussion of similar graphs for major industrial countries, 
see Kouri-Macedo(1979,p.35). 
38 This is shown in Macedo(1979b) and (1979c,Section III). 
39 See evidence in Macedo(1979c.Section II) 
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nata Appendix 
Sample Period lql4-1Q50 
1. POUNDA Average pound escudo exchange rate from AE, see footnote 
33 in the text 
2. POCOL Portuguese cost of living index 1914 ~ 100, see same foot­
note 
3. UKCOL UK coqt oe living index, see same footnote 
4. RESX Real escudo sterling rate (2) over (3) times the index 
from (1) 
Sample period 1929-1978 
5. ESAE End of period escudo dollar rate. AE before 1936, IFS 
thereafter (tape begins in 1948) 
6. POP IN Portuguese consumer price index 2 until 1952, linked to 
IFS, line 64 
7. USPIN US consumer price index from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
as reported in Historical Statistics of the US until 1948 
linked to IFS, line 64 thereafter 
8. PPIE End of year purchasing power of the escudo in terms of 
dollars, inverse of (7) times index from (5 ) 
9. REXIE End of period real exchange rate. (8) times (6) 
Sample period 1935-1978 
10. NNFABP Foreign assets of the Bank of Portugal in billion escudos 
1935-1947 Wallich (1951, p. 28) 
1948-1975 IFS tape 
1976-1978 Relatorio do Banco de Portugal 
11. RNFABP Real foreign assets of the Bank of Portugal (10) times 
(8) 
12. GREXIE Rate of change of (10) in i. per annum 
13. RBNMT R1:al balance on monetary transactions in billion of real 
escudos. Yearly change in (11). 
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POUNDA POCOL UKCGL RESX 
1914. 5.6610 100.00 100.0J 100.00 
1915. 6. 74 so 115.5J 12 5. 00 77. 54 3 
1916. 7.0370 137.10 147.5:) 74.854 
1917. 7. 7260 162.3') 180.0J 66. 090 
1918. 7.9)1) 292.7) 2 J2. 5 J 1 03. 60 
lql'1. 13.19h0 316.80 207.5) 105.4g 
ic120. 18.329 55 1. 6 0 252.QJ 67.h29 
19?. l. 3c;.3g4 Bl6.7J 719.·J) 53.6?2 
192?.. (,5.084 11?8.0 184.l)J 53.341 
1923. 109.71 171q.5 l6Q.OJ 52.517 
1924. 133.95 265?.0 1 70.0J 65.952 
1925. 99.210 2286.4 1 73. 0) 75.439 
1926. 94.770 2147.9 17J.0) 75.499 
1 9? 7. lOB.'36 2430.l 166.00 76.506 
1928. lQR. 7-5 2293.G 165.01 72.729 
1929. lJP.2', 2272.4 161.::n 73.83Q 












193 3. 109.10 2001.5 138.1)) 75.?Rl 
1934. 11).45 2J07.4 141.0) 72.993 
1035. 110.36 2007.4 143.00 72.C>Jl 
lq36. 110.39 2•) 55. 2 146.1),) 72.222 
19:!7. 11-).~Q 2126.Q 155.0J 7J.4()3 
1 9~ 9. 110.3P 2'.)55. ;:> 156.00 67.587 
193°. 110.27 l93c:;. 7 15>3.0J 62.917 
194'.). lJ?.73 2'J 31. 3 184.0J 60.'359 
1941. lOJ.20 2 2 ~4. 2 199.0') 65.15f:-
1942. 10J.2J 2796.0 200.0) 79.Jll 
1 943. 100.?Q 3154.5 199.0) 89.589 













l 0 4 7. 10'.).2() 4159.2 203.0') 115.77 
1q4g. 10).2) 3~19.2 223.~J 9q. 194 
1949. 94.79;) 4041.l 225.33 10 7. 14 
1950. 80.651) 4091.9 231.42 123.P5 
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1Q34. 21.49, 84.JQ) 78.169 106.78 104.29 
1935. 21.970 84.001) 80.117 101.90 99.531 
1936. 2?.46J :'.36.001 80.897 lOJ.00 100.00 
1937. 22.QQ) 87.04!) ~4.069 97.839 1 00. 05 
1938. ?3.670 38.586 82. 48 3 93.064 95.863 
1939. ? 7. 65 J QJ.526 81. 84 8 80.286 84.511 
1940. 25.010 98.932 A2. 481 88.078 101.32 
1941. 25.090 108.61 85.972 84.233 106.40 
1942. 25.05J 123.5,) CJ5.l7? 7&.212 109.45 
1941. 25.0'50 137.73 101.20 71.f.73 114.78 
1944. 2c;.oc;J 154.54 102.79 7 J. 56 7 126.81 
1945. ?4. 940 168.12 105.3l 69.170 135.? 2 
1946. 24 •.940 184.29 113. 89 63.958 137.07 










43. 74 8 
109.73 
95.719 
1950. 28.Q:)') lR6.87 141.81 44.335 96.337 
1951. 










85. 83 7 
1953. 
1954. 























1959. 28.751 198.51 170.36 37.097 85.630 
1959. ?8.ARO ?.01.10 171.94 36.5i3q 85.559 
1960. 28.830 2'}6.c:;2 174.4<3 36;!2J 86 ~9)4 
l 96 l. 2 8. P,J J ?.l0.15 176.~9 35.767 87.40i 
196?. 28.950 215.<;7 178.29 3 5. 324 88.708 
1961. 28.890 21Q.85 18J.51 34.~41 89.067 
l 964. 2A.950 228.26 182.7~ 34.146 91. l 60 
1965. 2R.83.J 216.01 185.0.0 33.901 93.036 
1966. 2A.9~J 247.65 191.61 32. 7? 0 94.224 
















































l 56. 76 
1976. 31.550 783.05 33 5. 64 17.158 156.23 
1 Q77. 39.850 97:~. 16 357.5~ 12.753 144.31 
1978. 46.010 ll05. l 384.49 10.271 131.97 
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NNFABP RNF~BP GREX IE RBN'1T 
1935. 1.5000 1.5285 -4. 5646 . 
}qJ6. 1.6000 1.6000 • 4711~ .71478E-Ol 
1g37. l .60-J·J 1.5654 .45166E-Ol - • 345 83E-Ol 
1938. 1.6001) 1.4890 -4.1'309 -.76400E-Ol 
1939. 1.7000 1.3649 -11. 842 -.12417 
1q4J. 2.6JJJ 2.2900 19.892 .92516 
1941. 6.100') 5.1382 5.0108 2.8482 
1942. l O. 60·) 8.0785 2. 8646 2. 9403 
1943. 13.5rJ() 9.6758 4.8763 1.5974 
1944. 16.100 11.361 10.475 1.6854 
1945. 18.lJJ 12.52() 6.6334 1.1585 
l 946. 18.700 11. 962 1.3712 -.55781 
194 7. 15.90,J 9.1828 -7.813'3 -2.7791 
1948. 12.7J6 6.5524 -13.162 -2.6304 
1949. 12.450 5.4466 -12.770 -1.1058 
1950. 13. 52 8 5.9976 .64588 .55104 
1951. 15.955 6.5464 -8.7343 .54879 
1952. 16.197 6.5109 -2.3722 -.35516E-Ol 
l<:}51. 17.670 7.0459 - • 1062 9 _-53495 
1954. 18.831) 7.4783 .64l94 .43246 
1955. 19.270 7. 6684 .20)77 .19011 
1956. 19.91() 7.8133 1.6850 .14486 
l 95 7. 19.710 7.5076 -1.3095 -.30573 
1958. 20.~4') 7.5455 -1.3214 .37979E-Ol 
t 95 9. 20.710 7.5777 -.83324E-Ol • 32129E-Ol 
1960. 20.640 7.4551 1.5730 -.12256 
1961. 113. 5 )J 6.6169 .57122 -.83818 
1<162. 22.R40 8.0680 1.4959 1.4511 
1q63. 23.A90 8.3235 .404Bq .25554 
i964. 27.2?'} 9.349i 2.3493 1.0255 
1965. 29.230 9.9092 2. 05 AG .56012 
1966. 33.020 1J.8J4 1.2775 .A9502 
196 7. 36.640 11.728 3.1882 .92367 
_196 8. 39.770 12.256 1. 9949 .52772 
l96q. 40.98J 12.030 3.7154 -.22598 
l 970. 42.330 11. 696 .18291 -.333q2 
197 l. 52.420 14.486 11 .915 2. 7904 
l 972. 62.33,') 17.016 9.2918 2.5301 
1973. 70.330 18.872 10.937 1.8558 
1974. 54.660 13.893 18.639 -4. 9792 
19.75. 31.860 6.6426 -5.4956 -7.2502 
1976. 3.5100 .60225 -. 3 4084 -6.0404 
1977. -l2.54J -1. 5992 -7.6313 -2.2014 
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